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A BLUE THAI AFFAIR:
THE BLUE DIAMOND AFFAIR'S ILLUSTRATION
OF THE ROYAL THAI POLICE FORCE'S
STANDARDS OF CORRUPTION
Meghan A. McClincy *
The Blue Diamond Affair, an international jewelry heist, captivated the world’s
attention because of its unresolved murders, its implication of law enforcement and
public officials from two divergent countries, and the resulting diplomatic tensions
between Thailand and Saudi Arabia. The crime also demonstrates the
inadequacy of the policies that governed the conduct of the Royal Thai Police Force
and how the policies allowed, if not perpetuated corruption within the Royal Thai
Police Force. This comment provides an overview of the Blue Diamond Affair,
analyzes the Thai criminal statutes and policies, and explores possible remedies
for police corruption in Thailand and the application of such remedies more
broadly.
INTRODUCTION
With the right casting and a sweeping musical score, "The Blue Diamond
Affair" could become Hollywood's next blockbuster hit. The spoiler alert would
read: "Theft of Saudi heirlooms remains one of Thailand’s biggest unsolved
mysteries, followed by a bloody trail of destruction implicating some of Thailand’s
top police generals."1 This great, international "whodunit" occurred more than two
decades ago and yet many question remain, most importantly, how the Royal Thai

Meghan A. McClincy, J.D. candidate 2012, Penn State University Dickinson School of
Law. I would like to thank Kevin & Lisa McClincy and Michael & Traci McClincy for their love,
support, and most importantly – their patience. I would also like to thank Bryce Miles, Matthew Kita,
and the entire JLIA Editorial Board & Staff for their editing assistance throughout the writing
process.
1 Thai PM Meets Saudi Envoy to Settle 20-year Jewellery Theft, WORLD BULLETIN, Jan. 11, 2010,
http://www.worldbulletin.net/news_detail.php?id=52473 [hereinafter Thai PM Meets Saudi Envoy].
*
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Police Force remained unscathed. 2 In Thailand, the most sensational crimes
frequently involve the Thai police as prime suspects.3
The comment begins with an overview of "The Blue Diamond Affair."
Here, the background of the heist and subsequent unsolved murders will be
described. 4 The comment then addresses the crime's international ramifications
including: the delegated chargé d'affaires; 5 a damaged diplomatic relationship
between Thailand and Saudi Arabia; and the detrimental effects the failing diplomacy
between Thailand and Saudi Arabia has had on Thai citizens,6 including the adverse
effects on Thai workers and business industries.7
The second part of the comment analyzes Thai police policies and statutes,
which allow, if not perpetuate, corruption within the Thai police force.8 Specifically,
this section will demonstrate how Thai police officials interpret statutes to promote
and insulate corrupt agents within the police force and protect unethical practices
from outside probes. The section also explains how Thai police craft statutes, which
on their face advance crooked policies.
The comment's final section will explore how corruption within the Thai
police force can be remedied.9 Measures of reform include training and education by
international organizations such as the International Law Enforcement Academy in
Bangkok, Thailand; solidarity with and political influence from the Thai citizen-ran
government organization, the Public Anti-Corruption Commission; and the impact
and social utility of the private sector, including the Thai Institute of Directors.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE BLUE DIAMOND AFFAIR
A. The Theft of the Jewelry
The mystery begins in 1989 when Kriangkrai Techamong, a Thai gardener
and janitor working in one of the palaces of Saudi Prince Faisal bin Fahd, crawled
into a bedroom and stole some 200 pounds of jewelry. 10 The stash of precious

See id.
See The Thai Police; A Law Unto Themselves, ECONOMIST, Apr. 19, 2008,
http://www.economist.com/node/11058580 [hereinafter Law Unto Themselves].
4 See infra pp. 2-8.
5 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 265 (9th ed. 2009). A chargé d'affaire is a diplomat who is
second in command in a diplomatic mission.
6. See Thai PM Meets Saudi Envoy, supra note 1.
7 See Saudi Envoy Appreciates Thai Court Efforts in Missing Businessman Case, BBC WORLDWIDE
MONITORING, Jan. 13, 2010 [hereinafter Saudi Envoy] (explaining the importance Thai workers have
on Saudi industry).
8 See infra pp. 8-20.
9 See infra pp. 19-27.
10
Andrew Marshall, The Curse of the Blue Diamond, REUTERS BLOG (Sept. 22, 2010),
http://blogs.reuters.com/andrew-marshall/2010/09/22/the-curse-of-the-blue-diamond/.
2
3
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jewels and gems included a famous and rare blue diamond.11 Kriangkrai stuffed the
loot, including the precious blue diamond,12 into a vacuum cleaner bag13 and shipped
them back to Thailand via DHL. He fled Saudi Arabia soon thereafter.14
Upon arriving in Lampang, a province in Northern Thailand, Kriangkrai had
a difficult time disposing of the stolen goods.15 Consequently, he sold the individual
pieces at incredibly low prices.16 Santhi Sithanakan, a local jeweler, caught word of
Kriangkrai's collection17 and purchased the bulk of the gems at a fraction of their
value.18
By this time, Saudi royals realized they had been robbed and notified
Thailand authorities about Kriangkrai.19 While it did not take long for Thai officials
to arrest the thief, Kriangkrai had already sold the jewels to Santhi.20 Then, through
Kriangkrai, a team of police led by Lieutenant-General Chalor Kerdthes (Chalor)
tracked down Santhi and quickly announced recovery of the jewels.21 Kriangkrai was
sentenced to seven years in jail.22 Despite the arrest and proclaimed recovery of the
jewels, Saudi Arabia dispatched three diplomats, 23 Abdullah Al-Besri, Fahad AZ
Albahli, Ahmed A Alsaid, and a private citizen and businessman trusted by the royal
family, Mohammad al-Ruwail, to Bangkok to investigate the theft.24
B. The Subsequent Murders
On February 1, 1990, one of the Saudi diplomats, Adbullah Al-Besri was
killed in Bangkok.25 Ten minutes later, the two other Saudi diplomats – Fahad AZ
Albahli and Ahmed A Alsaif – were assassinated in Bangkok.26 During the same
11
See
Treasures
of
the
World:
Hope
Diamond,
PBS.ORG,
http://www.pbs.org/treasuresoftheworld/a_nav/hope_nav/hnav_level_2/level2_pitch_science_hop
frm.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2010) (explaining the rarity and high value of blue diamonds).
12 See Christopher Shay, Thailand's Blue Diamond Heist: Still a Sore Point, TIME, Mar. 7, 2010,
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1969920,00.html.
Thailand's Department of
Special Investigation (DSI) cannot confirm whether the Saudi princess' rare blue diamond exists.
13 See id. The former Saudi chargé d'affaires told the Washington Post that the Thai worker
stuffed "rubies the size of chicken eggs" in the vacuum cleaner bag. Id.
14 See Marshall, supra note 10.
15 See id.
16 See id. Kriangkrai allegedly sold a few of the priceless jewels for thirty dollars.
17 See Terry McCarthy, Saudi Gems Theft Leaves Deadly Trail in Thailand, THE INDEPENDENT
(LONDON), Sept. 25, 1994, available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/saudi-gems-theftleaves-deadly-trail-in-thailand-1450865.html. Rumors circulated that Kriangkrai's loot included
diamond-studded watches, necklaces heavy with jewels, and one fifty-carat diamond.
18 See Marshall, supra note 10.
19 See Shay, supra note 12.
20 See id.
21 See Marshall, supra note 10.
22 See Shay, supra note 12. Kriangkrai's sentence was later reduced to three years because he
confessed to the crime.
23
See Timeline of the Blue Diamond Affair, JOTMAN.COM (Oct. 1, 2010),
http://jotman.blogspot.com/2009/08/timeline-of-blue-diamond-affair.html [hereinafter Timeline].
24 See Marshall, supra note 10.
25 See Timeline, supra note 23.
26 See id.
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month, Ruwaili, the Saudi businessman, disappeared, presumably murdered.27 The
four murders remain unsolved.28
Saudis suspected that the Thai police were involved in the murders of the
men and, in response, Saudi Arabia downgraded diplomatic relations with Thailand
and assigned a terse chargé d’affaires, Mohammed Said Khoja, to Bangkok to
investigate the murders and the theft.29 Khoja concluded that all four Saudis had
discovered important information about what had happened to the jewels and had
been murdered30 by Thai government officials to silence them.31
A month after the four murders, Chalor announced that the police had
discovered the remaining jewels and flew with a delegation to Saudi Arabia to return
the jewels to Prince Faisal.32 Chalor and his police team returned the jewels to Saudi
Arabia in "a public ceremony, designed to show how efficiently they had done their
job, and to strengthen the cordial relations between Thailand and the Gulf state."33
Despite the grand public display of rapprochement, Saudi officials soon discovered
that the returned gems were fake, 34 replaced by paste replicas and that the blue
diamond was still missing.35
Under pressure from the Saudis, the Thai police force continued to
investigate the unsolved theft and subsequent murders.36 In 1994, jeweler Santhi was
kidnapped and tortured upon the orders of Chalor. 37 Not long afterwards, the
bodies of Santhi's wife and fourteen-year-old son were found in their wrecked
vehicle on a highway just outside Bangkok.38 Thai police forensic officers declared
the deaths to be the result of an automobile accident; however, later autopsies
demonstrated the victims died from blows to the head,39 suggesting the deaths were
staged and that the police forensic officers lied.40 The Washington Post quoted the
former Saudi chargé d'affaires, "[t]he forensic commander thinks we're stupid. This
was not an accident."41

See id.
See Marshall, supra note 10.
29 See Timeline, supra note 23.
30 See Shay, supra note 12. The United States non-governmental organization, Foundation
for Democracy in Iran, claimed in a 1996 report that the 1990 murders of the Saudi diplomats were
the result of Iranian hit squads. The DSI, which took over the case from the Thai police in 2004, said
the alleged Iranian connection to the murders was a meritless rumor.
31 See Marshall, supra note 10.
32 See Shay, supra note 12.
33 McCarthy, supra note 17.
34 See Shay, supra note 12. Local Thai press reported rumors of circulating photos of
bureaucrats' wives wearing new diamond necklaces at a Thai charity event. Allegedly, the necklaces
were uncannily similar to the stolen pieces.
35 See id.
36 See id.
37 See Marshall, supra note 10.
38 See id.
39 See id.
40 See id.
41 Shay, supra note 12.
27
28
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A few months later, Chalor was arrested by the Thai police and charged with
ordering the murders of the jeweler's wife and son. 42 Chalor was later convicted of
receiving the stolen gems. Although the Thai Supreme Court upheld his conviction
and death sentence in October 2009,43 Chalor continues to maintain his innocence
on the theft and murder charges.44
Despite Chalor's conviction and criminal sentence, Thai-Saudi relations
remain strained. As the twenty-year statute of limitations that applies to Mohammed
al-Ruwaili’s murder nears its end, there appears to be progress towards solving the
case. In 2000, the investigation into the theft and subsequent murders was reopened
under the lead of the Thai Department of Special Investigations (DSI). In January
2010, the Office of the Attorney General indicted a senior policeman, LieutenantGeneral Somkid Boonthanom, chief of police for Thailand's Region 5, for the
murder of Saudi businessman Ruwaili.45 Four other policemen have been indicted
and all five are awaiting trial.46 However, in September 2010, despite his indictment,
Somkid was promoted to the post of assistant national police chief. 47 The
promotion of an indicted murdered caused disbelief and frustration throughout the
Saudi government.48
C. The Damaged Diplomatic Relationship and Its Ramifications
Following the unsettled theft of the royal jewels and unsolved murders of
their fellow statesmen, Saudi Arabia downgraded its diplomatic relations with
Thailand. 49 Consequently, Saudi Arabia banned the recruitment of Thai workers,
prohibited its citizens from traveling to Thailand, stopped all its national carrier's
flights to Bangkok, and ordered its businesspersons to replace Thai employees with
other workers.50 Inevitably, these restrictions caused a sharp drop in the number of
Thai workers51 in Saudi Arabia; specifically, the number of Thai workers dropped
from 200,000 in 1989 to merely 10,000 in 2011.52 The Saudis intended the reduced
diplomatic presence in Bangkok to be a sign of protest until justice was served with

See id. During the trial it emerged that four men had confessed to carrying out the
murders on the orders of police, and that police had tried to extort a $2.5 million ransom from the
jeweler.
43 See id.
44 See id. Chalor told the Times of London that, "Not all people in jail are guilty." Id.
However, he remains in prison, where he has put together a band and recorded a Thai cover of Elvis
Presley's "Jailhouse Rock." See id.
45
See Deputy PM Suthep's Letter to Ashri, BANGKOK POST, Sept. 23, 2010,
http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/politics/197716/deputy-pm-suthep-letter-to-ashri [hereinafter
Letter].
46 See Marshall, supra note 10.
47 See id.
48 See id. The promotion contention will be further explored in the second section.
49 See The Missing Pillar in Thai-Gulf Ties, GULF NEWS, May 4, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR
8303469 (WL).
50 See id.
51 See Thai PM Meets Saudi Envoy, supra note 1.
52. See id.
42
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the perpetrators behind bars or at the very least "until their names and their lives
were ruined."53
Thailand's airline industry has suffered because of the weak diplomatic ties
between the two nations. 54 In September 2009, Thai Airways International
executives attempted to negotiate a plan for resuming non-stop flights between
Bangkok and Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.55 However, the airline’s efforts were in vain; the
Riyadh's reaction revealed, "unspoken, but clear disapproval" due to continued
dissatisfaction with the Thai authorities' response to the unsolved jewelry theft and
resulting murders.56 In spite of the international turmoil between the two countries,
Saudi Arabia allows Thai Airways to provide a limited number of flights between the
two countries on a chartered basis mainly for pilgrims 57 to Mecca.58 Nonetheless,
Thai Airways left the negotiation realizing it may be better off not trying to reestablish service in spite of the bid's lucrative potential.59
Regardless of persisting diplomatic gridlock, the Thai government continued
to make efforts to amend relations.60 In July 2010, a Thai government official, the
Democrat Party MP for Phitsanulok and advisor to the House Committee on Labor
Affairs, prepared to seek Saudi Arabian King Abdullah's forgiveness for Thailand's
failure to solve the cases of the missing jewelry and the murder of Saudi diplomats.61
The formal apology, signed by the committee and thirteen labor organizations,
sought the King's pardon in order to restore diplomatic relations between the two
countries.62 Similarly, in August 2010, the Thai Deputy Ministry of Commerce met
with Saudi officials to discuss future economic collaboration at both private and
public levels.63 The Ministry also met with Saudi Arabia’s largest rice importers to
pen agreements on the purchase of Thai rice.64
Even though individual Thai government agencies have made strides in
navigating the channels of international clemency and cooperation, the Thai police
have continued to thwart any prospects for alliance and amnesty. By examining Thai
statutes and police regulations, the comment's next section will demonstrate how
53

Id.

54 See

Direct Saudi Flights Elusive, BANGKOK POST, Sept. 10, 2009, available at A200909092D1D6E0-GNW (LEXIS) [hereinafter Direct Saudi Flights].
55 See id.
56 Id.
57 See Saudi Arabia to Issue Hajj Visas for Thai Pilgrims, NATION (BANGKOK), Sept. 24, 2010,
http://www.asianewsnet.net/home/news.php?id=14528. Despite recent speculation that Saudi
Arabia would deny visas for Thai pilgrim, the Saudi Arabian embassy promised it would issue visas for
all 13,000 Thai Muslims planning to go on the Hajj pilgrimage.
58 See Direct Saudi Flights, supra note 54.
59 See id.
60 See Thailand Steps Up Efforts to Restore Diplomatic Ties With Saudi Arabia, THAI PRESS
REPORTS, July 23, 2010, available at A2010072357-20A4C-GNW (LEXIS).
61 See id.
62 See id.
63 See id.
64 See Thailand, Saudi Arabia to Form Joint Business Council, FNWEB.COM, Aug. 6, 2010, available
at A20100806B-20C9A-GNW (LEXIS).
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Thailand's police directive promulgates corruption within the Thai police force,
making resolution of the theft and subsequent murders unlikely if not impossible.65
II. CORRUPTION AND THE ROYAL THAI POLICE FORCE
The Asian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) declares that all citizens,
including state agencies and officials, must be uniformly held accountable under the
rule of law, and only then will citizens' rights and dignities be protected.66 Under a
system of law enforcement, as in the United States, citizens' rights and dignities are
safeguarded. However, Thailand follows a system of order-enforcement;67 and under
order-enforcement, citizens are not ensured the same liberties and protections.68 To
implement a uniform and effective system of justice, the Thai police must transform
from a system of order-enforcement to a system of law enforcement.69
Under order-enforcement, the idea of burden of proof is irrelevant, a
standard procedure for criminal investigations is inessential, and unequal treatment
and due process and equal treatment are fictional concepts. 70 Antithetically, law
enforcement requires thorough criminal investigations, submission of evidence, and
consistent protection of civil liberties.71 Under its current standards of operation,
Thailand's police force preserves a system of order-enforcement by allowing the
practice of torture, implicating witnesses, inhibiting the role of prosecution, and
promoting corrupt state agents.
A. Practice of Torture
Currently, Thailand has no specific legal provision penalizing torture. 72
Despite recent talks of negotiation,73 Thailand has yet to ratify the U.N. Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.74 A common justification of torture is that it is the cheapest method of
criminal investigation.75 Under this "might equals right"76 principle, the Thai police
See infra pp. 9-20.
See Asian Human Rights Commission, Rule of Law and Human Rights in Asia, (2006), at 7,
http://www.ahrchk.net/pub/pdf/RoL_HRinAsia.pdf [hereinafter Human Rights in Asia].
67 See id.
68 See id.
69 See id. at 50.
70 See Human Rights in Asia, supra note 66, at 66.
71 See id.
72 See id. at 27.
73 See ASSOCIATION FOR THE PREVENTION OF TORTURE, THAILAND: Implementing the UN
Convention
Against
Torture,
(May
13,
2009),
http://www.apt.ch/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=874:thailand-implementing-the-unconvention-against-torture&Itemid=227&lang=en. The Association for the Prevention of Torture
(APT) is a non-governmental organization that seeks to open all places of detention to international
and national scrutiny. See id. In May 2009, the APT organized training workshops in Bangkok in aims
to garner support and action for the implementation of the U.N. Convention Against Torture in
Thailand. See id. The workshop constructed a three-year plan of action for the implementation of the
U.N. Convention Against Torture. See id.
74 See Human Rights in Asia, supra note 66 at 27.
75 See id. at 68.
65
66
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force values physical power over brain power because it is a less costly investigative
practice.77 Along with the fact that policing by coercion is less costly for the Thai
police force, it is also promoted by the Thai government.78 During Thailand's 2003
war on drugs, the Thai government incited police and public officials to organize and
endorse murder in the name of ridding the nation of drugs.79 The police officers
were encouraged to unlawfully execute alleged drug dealers through the promise of
financial rewards, promotions, and threats of transfers and dismissals. 80 Specifically,
then Prime Minister Thaskin Shinawatra, made a series of public statements
portraying drug-dealers as sub-humans who deserved to die.81 In the end, Thailand's
war on drugs took 2,500 lives.82 The events of Thailand's war on drugs demonstrate
that those in the government expect the police to be their puppets in achieving their
policy demands.
The Thai government demands their police to accomplish the government's
goals by any means necessary. 83 Therefore, the complicity of the police seriously
undermines acceptable principles of the rule of law and instead approves the practice
of torture. Meaning, if the individuals torturing citizens are the same ones who are
supposed to protect citizens, chaos and corruption ensues, enabling backdoor
murders and mysterious disappearances of criminal defendants, victims, and
witnesses.

Interview with Bryce Miles, International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) Deputy
Director (Oct. 16, 2010) [hereinafter Interview]. Mr. Miles is currently assigned in Bangkok, Thailand
where he has serves as a Diplomatic Security Special Agent. See id. He has a B.A. in Political Science
from Louisiana State University, 1991, and an M.S. in Strategic Intelligence, National Defense
Intelligence College, 2008. See id. It should also be noted that Mr. Miles conferred with outside
sources, including a senior Thai national United States Embassy employee, a retired Thai police
general, and a Thai police colonel to provide answers to interview questions. See id. Regarding the
application process to become a Royal Thai policeman, Mr. Miles said that, "it's not terribly difficult
to be selected as a regular Thai policeman." Id. He equated the level of difficulty to enlisting in the
United States Army. See id.
77 See id. Mr. Miles explained that police training in Thailand is not up to United States
standards for two reasons: 1) the culture does not encourage active student participation or
resourcefulness; and 2) the Thai police force lacks the required budget and assets to train the "hard
skills," needed for complex investigations and police raids. Id.
78 See ASIAN LEGAL RESOURCE CENTRE, Thailand: "Unsubstantiated" Police Abuse, Impunity and
Human Rights Charades, (Sept. 3, 2009), http://www.alrc.net/doc/mainfile.php/alrc_st2009/577
[hereinafter Unsubstantiated].
79 See Human Rights in Asia, supra note 66, at 55. Through a series of memos, official orders,
and public statements, the Thai police were directed to organize and carry out the ordered murders.
80 See id. at 55.
81 See id. at 56-57. The Prime Minister said, "We have to shoot to kill and confiscate their
[drug dealers] assets as well, so their sinful inheritance will not be passed on." Id. He also stated,
"Don't be moved by the high death figures. We must be adamant and finish this war . . . When you
go to war and some of your enemies die, you cannot become soft-hearted, otherwise the surviving
enemy will return to kill you." Id.
82 See Unsubstantiated, supra note 72.
83 See Human Rights in Asia, supra note 66, at 57.
76
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B. Lack of Witness Protection
Though Thailand has witness-protection legislation,84 the existence of such
legislation does not necessarily translate into its enforcement or protection for
citizens. 85 Thailand's witness protection legislation, Witness Protection Act B.E.
2546 (2003), offers little more than a thumbnail sketch of the necessities and
practices for witness protection.86 Specifically, Section 244 affirms that in a criminal
case a witness has "the right to protection, proper treatment, necessary and
appropriate remuneration from the State as provided by law."87 However, the Act
does not outline, in detail, any of the practical steps or issues arising from witness
protection.88 Additionally, the Act fails to consider what measures should be taken
to ensure protection or what standard should be used to provide protection.89 The
failure of specificity leaves the door open for disparities in methods of dealing with
witness protection.90
Moreover, the Act's ambiguous definition of "witness,"91 serves as a catalyst
for inconsistency.92 Specifically, the exclusion of "defendants" from the definition of
persons who may seek protection is alarming. In Thailand, many defendants fall
victim to unlawful treatment, such as forced self-incrimination, doctored evidence,
and fraudulent record-keeping.93 Given the Royal Thai Police's infamous reputation
for corruption,94 these potential victims are among the persons in greatest need of
protection.95 Officially, in Section 13,96 the statute establishes a Witness Protection
Office.97 The Witness Protection Office works in a supervisory capacity with other
See HUMAN RIGHTS CORRESPONDENCE SCHOOL, Lesson 2: Case Study of Thailand's Fledgling
Witness Protection Programme, http://www.hrschool.org/doc/mainfile.php/lesson47/184/ (last visited
Feb. 3, 2011) [hereinafter Lesson 2]. This lesson analyzes Thailand's Office of Witness Protection as a
case study, based on the report, Protecting Witnesses or Perverting Justice?, by the Asian Legal Resource
Centre, June 2006. See id.
85 See id.
86 See id.
87 Id.
88 See id.
89 See Lesson 2, supra note 84.
90 See id.
91 See id. The Act defines "witness" as "a person who commits himself/herself to be present
at, or testify, or give evidence to a competent official for investigation, a criminal interrogation, a
court for criminal proceedings, and includes an expert but not a defendant who himself/herself is a
witness." [Unofficial translation]. Id.
92 See id.
93 See id. While the Act was enacted to prevent intimidation and threats against witnesses,
the Act does not specifically address or define these issues. See id. Furthermore, Sections 21 and 23
establish light penalties for revealing the identity of witnesses, intimidating them, or causing harm or
death; however, "harm" is never qualified. Id.
94 See A Law Unto Themselves, supra note 3.
95 See Lesson 2, supra note 84.
96 See id. Section 5 states, "the Prime Minister, Ministers of Defence, Interior and Justice
shall be in charge of enforcement of this Act and, in relation to their respective Ministries, shall have
the power to appoint competent officials issue Ministerial Regulations and notifications for the
purposes of the Implementation of this Act." Id. The Act gives no direct guidance on how these
agencies are to cooperate. See id.
97 See id.
84
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governmental agencies, such as the Thai police. 98 In principle, the Act ensures
protection for witnesses and victims; in practice, the protection is to be provided by
the police, a group known for . . ..99
The Act does force the police to provide protection; rather, it is left to their
discretion to accept or reject such requests.100 Once a case is accepted, the police
obtain complete control; the police determine if protection is to be offered; the
extent of protection to be provided, and the duration of the protection. 101 The
police monopoly on power, without definitive and administered regulations,
undermines the purpose of the statute and consequently endangers the witness. 102
The statute's intended objective is further impaired by the statute's stringent
deadlines.103 Short-term protection may be inadequate in some cases, such as the
Blue Diamond Affair, which has taken years to work through the courts. 104
Furthermore, post-trial protection may be paramount to protect the livelihood of a
criminal witness or victim.105 As the statute operates now, it fails to accomplish its
stated goal to protect witnesses. Consequently, allegedly innocent individuals, such
as Santhi's wife and fourteen year old son, are left unguarded, in jeopardy, and
frequently go missing.106
C. Compromised Role of Prosecutors
In Thailand, the role of prosecutor has been undermined by the power of
high political authorities. In the United States, prosecutors have an active role in
criminal proceedings; prosecutors file the criminal charge and remain involved in the
investigation of the crime.107 Moreover, prosecutors thoroughly review the evidence
to confirm that evidence is obtained by lawful means, to ensure that the criminal
defendants', victims', and witnesses' human dignities and rights are preserved during
the investigative process, and to hold responsible and bring to justice those who fail
to comply with the two standards listed above.108

See id.
See id.
100 See Lesson 2, supra note 84.
101 See id.
102 See id.
103 See id. After the witness protection officer contacts the police and the police accept the
case, existing regulations provide protection up to twenty-one days. See id. Beyond the initial twentyone days, the commissioner can provide further protection for an additional sixty days. See id. For
protection beyond eighty-one days, approval from the police commissioner-general is required. See id.
104 See id.
105 See Lesson 2, supra note 84.
106 See Interview, supra note 76. Mr. Miles said that the Thai Department of Justice is currently
planning and funding a Thai Marshals Service. See id. The new agency's mission and legal authorities
will follow exactly those of the United States Marshall's service. See id.
107 See generally Human Rights in Asia, supra note 66, at 105-06.
108 See id. at 108.
98
99
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In Thailand, however, public prosecutors face many problems when
addressing human-rights cases, as pointed out by the AHRC.109 Under the color of
law, public prosecutors often work closely with the investigating agencies to assure
that cases are derailed, especially cases that implicate state officers.110
In the Blue Diamond Affair, after the assigned inquiry team determined that
Somkid should not be prosecuted, the public prosecutor issued an order of nonprosecution due to insufficient evidence.111 The public prosecutor then referred the
file to the Director-General of the Royal Thai Police Department in accordance with
Article 145, Paragraph 1, of the Criminal Procedure Code, which states,
In case there is an issue of a non-prosecution order other than that of
the Director-General of the Public Prosecution Department, if it is in
the Nakhorn Luang Krungtep Dhonburi [Bangkok], it is in
the...[Bangkok]the file of inquiry together with the order shall
forthwith be submitted to the Director-General, Deputy DirectorGeneral or Assistant Director-General of the Royal Thai Police
Department.112
The Director-General then reviewed the case and decided not to dissent from the
non-prosecution order of the public prosecutor.113 Nonetheless, in May 2000, the
Board of Special Cases of the Department of Special Investigations (DSI),114 decided
that the murder cases of the Saudi Arabian diplomats and businessmen should be
reopened as Special Cases under Article 21, Paragraph 1(2), of the Special
Investigation Act B.E. 2547 (1990). 115 In addition, under Article 32, the Act
stipulates that the public prosecutor shall participate in the investigation. 116
Subsequently, the public prosecutor decided to prosecute Police General Somkid.117
The incidents of the Blue Diamond Affair reflect a well-known contention
that exists between the DSI and public prosecutors.118 In Thailand, it is common
practice for public prosecutors to scrutinize the investigative officers' work, decline
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cases, and argue that there is insufficient evidence.119 Conversely, DSI agents120 argue
that the prosecutors' decision is a disingenuous obstacle to the court.121 However, it
is irrelevant which side is "right." In the end, the conflict between these law
enforcement entities undermines the role of prosecution and thwarts its purpose of
ensuring justice. Similarly, justice is further compromised when corruption by
officials is not only tolerated but also promoted.
D. Promotion of Corrupt State Agents
As explained earlier, the Blue Diamond Affair seemed to be making progress
when, in January 2010, the Attorney General indicted senior policeman Somkid and
four other policemen for the disappearance of Saudi-Arabian businessman
Mohammad al-Ruwaili.122 Sadly, this brief moment of hope was cut short in late
September 2010 when Thai government officials announced that Somkid, despite his
recent indictment, had been promoted to the post of assistant national police chief.123
To be expected, the Saudi Embassy in Bangkok responded with outrage and
disappointment.124
The Saudi Embassy issued a press release in which it questioned if the
promotion was granted in accordance with Thai law.125 The embassy cited Article 95
of the Thai National Police Act 2547 B.E., which declares that any police officer
who is alleged of or charged with breaching severe discipline or committing a
criminal act will be ordered to quit his post until the completion of the legal
proceedings.126 The press release noted the embassy’s astonishment that, despite the
clear purpose and objective of Article 95, the Thai government has not shown any
intention of taking disciplinary action against the police officers. 127 The embassy
further expressed concerns that the high-ranking officer accused in the case was
promoted to a position that may affect the course of legal proceedings against him.128
Consequently, the embassy warned that the promotion might seriously jeopardize the
restoration of bilateral relations between the countries.129
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A few days later, the Saudi Embassy issued a follow up press release.130 The
embassy emphasized that while the Saudi government did not intend to meddle in
Thailand's internal affairs, the Saudi Embassy would monitor the progress of the
investigations by the Thai authorities to uncover the mysteries that surround the 20year-old cases. 131 The letter emphasized Saudi Arabia's hope that "witness
transparency, justice, and non-interference" 132 will be applied to the cases that
directly concern the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.133
In a failed attempt to ease suspicion and turmoil, Deputy Prime Minister
Suthep Thaugsuban (PM Suthep) issued an explanation of the recent promotion.134
PM Suthep explained that because the Royal Thai Police Department had ceased all
disciplinary proceedings in November 1998, Royal Thai Police could no longer
conduct disciplinary proceedings against Somkid. 135 Specifically, because the
investigation occurred before the Royal Thai Police Act B.E. 2547 (2004) was
enacted, the matter fell in line with Article 6 of the Absolution Act B.E. (2007)
(Absolution Act).136 The Absolution Act states, "persons subjected to disciplinary
action where his or her superior officials ordered the termination of the case or the
commutation of sentence on or before the 5th December B.E. 2550 (2007) shall not
be further imposed additional punishment or disciplinary action against them on that
particular case."137 Consequently, PM Suthep explained that the Royal Thai Police
could no longer conduct disciplinary proceedings against Somkid since he was
investigated and punished before the Absolution Act's passing in 2007.138
In response, Mr. Nabil Ashir, the current chargé d'affaires of the Saudi
Embassy in Bangkok, said, "[e]very time I meet a Thai official, a different article of
law or law or set of laws is mentioned to me . . . . "139 Mr. Ashri further noted, "the
purpose of the laws, regulations, and the constitution is to benefit the general public
and not a certain individual." 140 He reiterated that the Saudi government is not
aiming to interfere with the Thai government; however, he asked for empathy for
Saudi Arabia's frustration, stating, "this particular case [of Mr. Al-Ruwaili] had been
classified as a special case according to the Thai justice system, so far we have seen
nothing special about it . . . . "141
Whether due to public pressure or his own good conscience, Somkid
declined to accept his appointment as Assistant National Police Chief in order to
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defuse the tension between the two countries.142 However, not even a week after his
decline, Somkid was offered and accepted a promotion to be the Police InspectorGeneral.143
It is unclear why Thailand, a country infamous for its corrupt police force 144
would pass legislation like the Absolution Act, 145 which essentially clears police
conduct which occurred pre-2007. At its core, the Absolution Act functions as a
"get out of jail free" card, which conveniently benefited Somkid. Though Somkid is
currently under a Special Case Investigation and is indicted for murder, 146 the police
disciplinary immunity under the Absolution Act allows him to not only maintain
employment as a police officer, but also be considered for a highly revered
promotion.147 Furthermore, it is perplexing why a nation would grant a substantial
promotion to a police officer who is currently charged with murdering a foreign
nation's diplomatic envoy.148 However, in Thailand, corruption is so deeply rooted
within the government that the most sensational crimes frequently involve the Thai
police as prime suspects.149 Hence, while the quantifiable repercussions of Thailand's
inner-government corruption can be identified, the remedies for the government's
misconduct are not as easily ascertained.
The next section will explore a few of the remedial measures in place, which
aim to turn Thailand's criminal investigation and prosecution regime from a
haphazard system of order-enforcement to an effectual system of law
enforcement.150 Analyzed reform efforts include law enforcement training facilitated
by the International Law Enforcement Academy in Bangkok, Thailand; political
corruption investigations conducted by the Thai government's Public AntiCorruption Commission; and the impact and social utility of Thailand's private
sector.
III. REMEDIAL MEASURES TO COMBAT CORRUPTION WITHIN THE
ROYAL THAI POLICE FORCE
A. International Law Enforcement Academy, Bangkok, Thailand
Although recent strides in technology have made the world smaller, the same
technological advancements have allowed international crime to emerge stronger
than ever. Organized crime operations colonize in countries with weak governments
and developing economies. To combat this new era of widespread international
See Pol Lt Gen Somkid Named as Inspector-General, THAI PRESS REPORTS, Sept. 27, 2010,
available at A2010092425-214A9-GNW (LEXIS). Somkid became Inspector-General as of Oct. 1,
2010.
143 See id.
144 See A Law Unto Themselves, supra note 3.
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crime, the United States developed a training agency, which seeks to train and
empower law enforcement officers with little to no experience, to organize law
enforcement units which operate efficiently, and to secure social order and protect
human rights.151 The U.S. State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and
Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) chair the International Law Enforcement Academy
(ILEA). 152 INL, along with law enforcement representatives from the State
Department, Department of Justice, Department of Homeland Security, and the
United States Treasury, select ILEA's targeted countries or areas of interest.153 Along
with promoting law enforcement cooperation between the United States and
targeted foreign nation, the Academy aims to: (1) provide professional law
enforcement training specifically tailored to meet the needs of the region; and (2)
facilitate professional law enforcement relationships among participants, both
internally and across international borders.154 ILEA's main areas of interest include
narcotics, terrorism, and transnational crime. 155 ILEA focuses on operational
training, such as criminal investigation strategies and current technology for evidence
forensics.156
Through ILEA’s work in Thailand, the level of professionalism has
improved significantly in the Royal Thai Police Force. 157 In light of this recent
success, ILEA is considering creating and sponsoring courses that focus on
combating corruption. 158 However, because corruption is woven so intricately
throughout the police force, ILEA is quite aware that it will take years, if ever, to
reform the "corporate culture" of patronage and corruption.159
Bryce Miles, Deputy Director of ILEA, Bangkok, explains that, "[c]orruption
is just the way [the Royal Thai Police Force] [does] business." 160 Mr. Miles explains
that though the police force, in general, is professional and cooperates well with
ILEA, its ethos is, "[w]hat is in it for us? Can we make a profit?"161 For example, if
a Thai police officer stops a citizen for an illegal turn, and the citizen asks to
immediately pay the fine, the police officer will personally pocket the money, and the
matter will be settled without citation, record, or court appearance. 162 These
occurrences result in widespread distrust of the police.163 The relationship between
the Thai citizen and Thai police officer cannot be defined as antagonistic, but instead
as apathetic, understanding that "this is the way they [Royal Thai Police Force
officers] are."164
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Despite the citizens' apathy towards the rampant corruption within the police
force, both Thai citizens and the Thai government are concerned about the negative
media attention, especially press articles that may have a damaging effect on
Thailand's tourist industry, an important component of the country's economy. 165
Such concerns are the impetus behind the Thai government's recent efforts to
combat corruption, including the establishment of the Public Anti-Corruption
Commission.166
B. Public Anti-Corruption Commission
Thailand's current prime minister, Abhisit Vejjajiva, recently addressed the
Fourteenth Annual International Corruption Conference in Bangkok. 167 In his
speech, the prime minster said:
The fight against corruption is a moral one and cannot be won by
legislation alone. We can have the best anti-corruption laws and
strictest enforcement in place, but if large sections of the population
remain persistently indifferent and apathetic about corruption, I’m
afraid we will continue to face an uphill battle. Let us be reminded of
these words of wisdom –– “the accomplice to the crime of
corruption is frequently our own indifference”.168
The prime minister is right; apathy is a significant obstacle to any reform movement.
Recently, sixty-five percent of Thai citizens believe the government's efforts against
corruption are “ineffective,” according to a Transparency International poll.169 The
Thai people's negative view is reflective of the National Counter Corruption
Commission (NCCC); the NCCC is the main coordinator of all anti-corruption
efforts and agencies in Thailand and currently filters all corruption complaints. 170
Unfortunately, even the NCCC has been disgraced with charges of corruption,
resulting in the termination of several commissioners for increasing their own
salaries in 2004.171
However, most recently, Thailand proposed the pioneering Public AntiCorruption Commission (PACC). 172 The Commission plans to post 2,000
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government-paid investigators to monitor and respond to allegations of corruption
throughout the country.173
Philip Guentert, a United States federal prosecutor detailed to the United
States Embassy in Bangkok believes that, “[t]he [anti-corruption commission] is
really the best bet to deal with [the] lowest levels of police corruption.”174 Guentert
is helping to train the investigators on how to build anti-corruption cases. He is,
however, quite aware that he and the commission face a long road to redemption. 175
The challenge lies in the corruption’s inherent sneakiness, such as everyday bribe
requests from street cops.176 Reform will come from the bottom up to rid the nation
of the "pettiest and most visible bribery"177 and reverse Thailand’s "bad" image.178
By researching more citizens' allegations and developing more investigations in
provinces where federal oversight is lacking, 179 the PACC intends to attack and
address these instances of petty, but prevalent, demonstrations of corruption by
Royal Thai policemen and low-level government officials.180
To date, the PACC has undertaken different investigations seeking to
suppress graft and implement an anti-corruption agenda. Specifically, the PACC
joined efforts with the DSI to crackdown on backstreet lending, which has inundated
low-income borrowers with insurmountable debt. 181 The PACC has also taken
efforts to ensure transparency in flood relief spending.182 In 2010, floods devastated
thirty-eight provinces, claiming ninety-four lives. 183 The PACC worked to ensure
that the required funds were properly used as emergency assistance for flood
victims.184 The PACC has also investigated suspicious issuing of land title deeds. 185
For example, a PACC investigator discovered that land officially given to local
farmers under a government agricultural reform project was actually used to build a
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golf course.186 Such efforts demonstrate that though the PACC is in its formative
period, its potential is promising.
Encouraging citizens to report instances of corruption is a significant leap
forward towards successful corruption reform. A cultural and societal revolution
requires not only legislation and government, but also the desire and cooperation of
an entire society, beginning with the private sector. 187 Prime Minister Abhisit
Vejjajiva urges,
Businesses are both perpetrators and victims of corruption. In spite
of an increasingly stringent legal framework, corruption remains a
challenge for companies in many parts of the world. Indeed, there is
little incentive for an individual company to take an anti-corruption
stance in a disconnected business world. Responsible enterprises that
take a zero tolerance stance on bribery and corruption find it very
challenging to live up to this commitment in countries or industries
where bribery is pervasive and extortion is a routine occurrence.
There is thus greater need than ever for a clear demonstration of
ethical business leadership.188
Along with government-implemented reform, there are calls for action from the
private sector, including the Thai Institute of Directors, to help restore government
credibility and dependability.
C. Private Sector's Role in Corruption Reform in Thailand
Corruption in Thailand not only affects the government and its citizens, but
also has a negative impact on the country's economy. 189 However, unlike other
developing countries, the private sector has not always been the source of corruption
in Thailand.190 In fact, in Thailand, the private sector plays opposing roles as both
victim and benefactor of corruption.191 Nonetheless, pressing the private sector to
take a leading role in combating corruption is crucial in Thailand, where political
turmoil has led to many shifts in power and policies over the past century. 192 In
essence, the private sector can continue to drive the anti-corruption campaign, in
conjunction with government agencies, in times when political debate can stall
reforms. 193 Under the strategy of "Collective Action Against Corruption," 194 the
private sector has begun efforts against corruption, drawing the joint forces of
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companies, governments, and civil society organizations to promote transparency in
business.
One such effort is the Thai Institute of Directors (IOD). 195 IOD is a notfor-profit, membership organization, established with assistance from Thailand
capital market institutions such as the U.S. (?) Securities and Exchange Commission,
The Stock Exchange of Thailand, The Bank of Thailand, and the Foundation for
Capital Market Development Fund, as well as international organizations such as the
World Bank.196 IOD's main mission is to improve professionalism and corporate
governance among directors of Thai businesses.197
IOD was established in 1999, and since its inception, IOD has been at the
forefront of promoting good governance practices in Thai companies. 198 IOD's
ideology is that effective directors produce well operated companies, which in turn
benefit shareholder value and sustainable growth of the Thai economy. 199 To
accomplish its goal, IOD conducts several key courses, which teach managing skills
and knowledge of good corporate governance essential for board members to
improve and develop their companies. 200 Additionally, IOD keeps its seminars
"current," consistently updating course content concerning the most recent issues in
corporate governance.201
Similar to ILEA and the PACC, IOD is an example of another innovative
reform measure in Thailand. Each of the three remedial measures attempts to curtail
corruption at its root. ILEA targets unprincipled law enforcement,202 PACC focuses
on crooked government actions,203 and IOD aims at unethical business practices. 204
These initiatives are three examples of developing strategies in the ongoing campaign
against corruption in Thailand.
IV. CONCLUSION
In Thailand, corruption occurs at all levels, implicating both the public and
private sectors. The universal misconduct in turn affects all classes of citizens,
including government officials, businesspersons, and ordinary citizens both at home
and abroad.
The Blue Diamond Affair accurately depicts the pervasiveness of corruption
in Thailand. The Blue Diamond Affair's web entangles an extensive class of citizens,
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ranging from Saudi royalty to Thai migrant workers. The jewelry heist not only
affected the crime's players and investigators, but also has disturbed the lives of
innocent bystanders.
The events and aftermath of the Blue Diamond Affair suggest that a
significant vulnerability of Thai civil society is the Royal Thai Police Force's statutes
and regulations. Current protocol of the Royal Thai Police Force nurtures the
practice of torture, undermines the importance of witness protection, compromises
the role of prosecutors, and promotes corrupt state agents. Thailand's economic and
diplomatic development is inhibited by the continuation of these practices, as
demonstrated most critically by its inability to renew diplomatic relations with Saudi
Arabia.
When such problems exist and corruption is so embedded within a society,
remedial reform requires a nationwide cooperative effort to rid the country of the
societal epidemic. Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva explained it best, urging "the
need for greater cooperation with civil society. As a direct beneficiary of any
effective anti-corruption program, civil society has always been a main driving force
in raising awareness of corruption and its harmful effects."205
Accordingly, Thai civil society has begun to take the proper steps for the
necessary overhaul and revitalized agenda for the Republic of Thailand. The reform
measures in place encompass a wide range of contributors, each providing skills,
expertise and fresh perspectives. Remedial programs include ILEA, which provides
law enforcement and criminal investigation expertise; the PACC, which encourages
citizen involvement in the effort to intercept and deter corrupt practices of the Thai
government; and the IOD, which provides the collaborative effort of industry
leaders to combat the prevalence of corruption and unethical business practices.
To succeed, Thailand must continue collaborative efforts to empower each
citizen as an official mouthpiece for the subjugated and as a recognized
whistleblower against the corrupt. Citizen-centric empowerment can be
reached through a strong alliance of government officials, law enforcement officers,
business people, and motivated citizens of Thailand. Thailand requires an allencompassing proactive campaign for change to transform Thailand’s overall
apathetic acceptance of corruption into a universal determined drive for reform and
reconstruction. Such a unified effort will lead Thailand to a more promising future; a
future free from unanswered instances of corruption, as witnessed in the unsolved
case of the Blue Diamond Affair.
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